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Terrorist Attacks & NEPA:
The Third Circuit Creates a Split in Authority
New Jersey Department ofEnvironmental Protection v. NRC'
I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the
threat of an airborne attack on a nuclear power plant became a major
national security concern. The United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (hereinafter "NRC") began implementing new regulations
aimed at increasing security at the nation's nuclear power plants.2
However, one major issue that remained was whether the NRC was
required under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (hereinafter
"NEPA") to issue an Environmental Impact Statement (hereinafter "EIS")
concerning the threat of an airborne terrorist attack when relicensing a
nuclear facility. The Ninth Circuit decided in the affirmative in San Luis
Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC. 3 Following Mothers for Peace, the
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (hereinafter
"NJDEP") sought a similar result when it intervened in the NRC's
relicensing of Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station (hereinafter
"Oyster Creek"), which led to the instant case.4 The Third Circuit's
decision in New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection v. NRC
creates a split in authority among the U.S. Court of Appeals' Circuits.
This note examines the court's analysis of the NEPA's
requirements regarding EISs and nuclear power plants. It also discusses
the split in authority created by New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection, as well as the need for a resolution of this issue by the U.S.
Supreme Court. This note will emphasize the NRC's actions in the wake
' 561 F.3d 132 (3d Cir. 2009).
2 MARK HOLT & ANTHONY ANDREWS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
SECURITY AND VULNERABILITIES 1-2 (2009), available at
http://ftp.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL34331.pdf.
3 449 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2006).
4 N.J. Dep 't ofEnvtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 132.
sId. at 142.
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of the September 11 attacks and how these actions do not trigger a
responsibility to prepare an EIS concerning such attacks under the NEPA.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station is a nuclear power
facility owned by the AmerGen Energy Company, L.L.C. (hereinafter
"AmerGen"). 6 The facility is located in New Jersey near Barnegat Bay.7
On July 22, 2005, AmerGen applied to the NRC to renew Oyster Creek's
operating license for an additional twenty years.8
Subsequently, in September of 2005, a notice of opportunity for
hearing was published by the NRC in the Federal Register.9 Shortly
thereafter, in November of 2005, the NJDEP filed a petition to intervene
with the NRC.'o
The NJDEP's petition raised three contentions." The first involved
"the appropriate calculation of metal fatigue for the reactor coolant
pressure boundary and associated components," and the second dealt with
"whether Oyster Creek had sufficient back-up power to operate during a
blackout."1 2 The third contention was the only one raised in the case at
hand and became the main issue: "whether the [NRC], when it is
reviewing an application to relicense a nuclear power facility, must
examine the environmental impact of a hypothetical terrorist attack on that
nuclear power facility."' 3
The NJDEP's claims were reviewed by the Atomic Safety and
Licensing Board (hereinafter "ASLB").14  The ASLB found "that
terrorism and 'design basis threat' reviews, while important and ongoing,







" Id. at 133, 135.
14 Id. at 135.
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lie outside the scope of the NEPA in general and of license renewal in
particular."' 5
The decision of the ASLB was appealed by the NJDEP to the NRC.16
The NRC denied the claim, agreeing "with the Board [ASLB] that
terrorism concerns are security issues, which are not addressed during
license renewal because they do not relate to the aging of the facility." 7
The NJDEP then appealed the order of the NRC by filing a petition for
review.18 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied the
petition for review, stating that because the NJDEP failed to meet its
burden of demonstrating that the NRC could evaluate risks more
meaningfully than it had already done, the "NJDEP did not present an
admissible contention before the NRC[] concerning the environmental
effects of a hypothetical aircraft attack on Oyster Creek."' 9 Additionally,
in addressing the NJDEP's contention, the court held that the NRC, in
reviewing a relicensing application, was not required to prepare an EIS
concerning the effects of potential airborne terrorist attacks.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Statutes and Regulations
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (hereinafter "AEA") provides the
NRC with the authority to issue a license to operate a commercial nuclear
reactor for up to forty years. 2 1 The AEA also authorizes the NRC to
renew that license for a period not to exceed an additional twenty years.22
The NRC's review of renewal applications is controlled by two sets of
regulatory requirements. The first is 10 C.F.R. Part 54, which requires




" Id. at 136.
'
91Id. at 144.
20 Id. at 133.
21 42 U.S.C. §§ 2133, 2134(b) (2006).
22 10 C.F.R. § 54.31 (2009).
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each applicant to include in its application for renewal an Integrated Plant
Assessment showing that "the effects of aging on the functionality of such
structures and components will be managed to maintain the [current
licensing basis] such that there is an acceptable level of safety during the
period of extended operation."23
The second set is 10 C.F.R. Part 51, which requires the NRC to
complete an environmental review of the applicant's facility under the
24NEPA. Congress passed NEPA with the intent to declare "a national
policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between
man and his environment." 2 5 The Act's two goals are to place "upon an
agency the obligation to consider every significant aspect of the
environmental impact of a proposed action" and ensure "that the agency
will inform the public that it has indeed considered environmental
concerns in its decisionmaking process." 26
When considering the licensing application of a nuclear facility
under the NEPA, the NRC divides specific issues into two separate EISs.
The first is the Generic Environmental Impact Statement (hereinafter
"GEIS"), which contains what are called "Category 1 issues" and is
prepared by the NRC.27 The GEIS "summarizes the findings of a
systematic inquiry into the environmental impacts of refurbishment
activities associated with license renewal and the environmental impacts
of continued operation during the renewal period (up to 20 years for each
licensing action)."28 The second EIS is the Specific Environmental Impact
23 Id. §§ 54.21, 54.3.24 N.J. Dep't ofEnvtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 133 (citing Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens
Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350-51 (1989)).
25 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006).
26 Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 553 (1978)
and citing Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw., 454 U.S. 139, 143 (1981)).
27 N.J Dep't ofEnvtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 134; 10 C.F.R. § 51.53(c)(3)(i) (2009); Notice of
Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for the License Renewal of Nuclear
Power Plants and to Conduct Scoping Process, 68 Fed. Reg. 33,209, 33,209 (June 3,
2003).
28 Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for the License
Renewal of Nuclear Power Plants and to Conduct Scoping Process, 68 Fed. Reg. at
33,209.
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Statement (hereinafter "SEIS"), which addresses "Category 2 issues."29
When submitting its application for renewal of its operating license, the
applicant must submit a supplemental Environmental Report (hereinafter
"Report"). 30 Based off of this Report, the NRC staff develops a site-
specific supplement to the GEIS and includes a recommendation for each
license renewal application.31 This site-specific supplement is the SEIS.32
B. Traditional Tort Law
The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that where a party's
negligent conduct affords an opportunity for an actor to commit a criminal
act, the criminal's conduct will be deemed a superseding cause unless "the
actor at the time of his negligent conduct realized or should have realized
the likelihood that such a situation might be created, and that a third
person might avail himself of the opportunity to commit such a tort or
crime." 33 Additionally, there are six factors that are to be considered in
determining if the intervening act of another is a superseding cause, thus
severing the liability of the original negligent actor:
(a) the fact that its intervention brings about harm different
in kind from that which would otherwise have resulted
from the actor's negligence; (b) the fact that its operation or
the consequences thereof appear after the event to be
extraordinary rather than normal in view of the
circumstances existing at the time of its operation; (c) the
fact that the intervening force is operating independently of
any situation created by the actor's negligence, or, on the
N.J. Dep't ofEnvtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 134-35 (citing 10 C.F.R. § 51.53(c)(3)(ii)).30 Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for the License
Renewal of Nuclear Power Plants and to Conduct Scoping Process, 68 Fed. Reg. at
33,209-10.
311id.
32 N.J Dep't ofEnvtl. Prot., 561 F.3d at 134-35 (citing 10 C.F.R. § 51.95(c)); Notice of
Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for the License Renewal of Nuclear
Power Plants and to Conduct Scoping Process, 68 Fed. Reg. at 33,209-10.
3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 448 (1965).
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other hand, is or is not a normal result of such a situation;
(d) the fact that the operation of the intervening force is due
to a third person's act or to his failure to act; (e) the fact
that the intervening force is due to an act of a third person
which is wrongful toward the other and as such subjects the
third person to liability to him; (f) the degree of culpability
of a wrongful act of a third person which sets the
intervening force in motion. 34
The Third Circuit had previously used such an analysis under tort law to
determine liability resulting from a terrorist attack.
In Port Authority of New York & New Jersey v. Arcadian Corp.,35
the owners of the World Trade Center brought suit against several
fertilizer manufacturers whose products were used in the 1993 bombing of
the World Trade Center.36 The plaintiffs alleged negligence on the part of
the manufacturers, claiming that their products made up part of the
explosive devices used in the bombing.37  After reviewing relevant
precedent and state concepts of tort law, the court found that "the World
Trade Center bombing was not a natural or probable consequence of any
design defect in defendants' products," and held that "the terrorists'
actions were superseding and intervening events breaking the chain of
causation." 38
C. NEPA and EIS
There are two important cases in which the Supreme Court
discussed the situations where the NEPA would require an agency to
prepare an EIS. 39  The first was Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People
34 1d. § 442.
" 189 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 1999).3 6Id. 308-09.
" Id. at 309.8 Id. at 318-19.
3 9 N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. NRC, 561 F.3d 132, 137 (3d Cir. 2009).
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Against Nuclear Energy,40 which involved the reopening of the nuclear
power plant on Three Mile Island after an accident in one of the reactors
forced the plant to be shut down.41 While determining whether activity at
the plant could be safely resumed, the NRC did not determine whether to
consider the psychological harm or other indirect effects of the accident or
of renewed operation.42 The petitioners in the case, People Against
Nuclear Energy, argued that the NEPA and the AEA required the NRC to
consider such issues.43
The Court held that "[t]o determine whether [NEPA] requires
consideration of a particular effect, we must look at the relationship
between that effect and the change in the physical environment caused by
the major federal action at issue."4 The Supreme Court first observed that
NEPA only required that the NRC assess the impact or effect of its
decision on the physical environment.45 The Court went on to explain that
NEPA only attaches when there is a "reasonably close causal relationshi
between a change in the physical environment and the effect at issue.'
The Supreme Court, like the Third Circuit in New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection, analogized the causal relationship to tort law
and the doctrine of proximate cause.47 Under such an analysis, the Court
found that damage to psychological health caused by the fear of a nuclear
accident was too attenuated.48
The second case in which the Supreme Court decided when the
NEPA would require an agency to prepare an EIS was Department of
Transportation v. Public Citizen,4 9 which involved the operation of
40 460 U.S. 766 (1983).
41 See id. at 766.
42 Id. at 769.
43 Id. at 770.
4Id. at 773.
45 Id. at 772.
46Id. at 774.
47 Compare id., with N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. U.S. NRC, 561 F.3d 132, 140 & n.8 (3d
Cir. 2009).
48 Metro. Edison Co., 460 U.S. at 775.
49 541 U.S. 752 (2004).
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Mexican tractor-trailer trucks on U.S. roads.5 0 The Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration (hereinafter "FMCSA"), published safety
regulations and procedures for the certification of these Mexican trucks
before the trucks were allowed to operate within the country.5 ' In addition
to these regulations, the FMCSA prepared an environmental assessment
that focused on the effects of the regulations.52 However, "[b]ecause
FMCSA concluded that the entry of the Mexican trucks was not an 'effect'
of its regulations, it did not consider any environmental impact that might
be caused by the increased presence of Mexican trucks within the United
States."53 The respondents in the case petitioned for review, asserting that
the NEPA required such an analysis of the impact of increased traffic from
Mexican trucks. 54
The Court held "that where an agency has no ability to prevent a
certain effect due to its limited statutory authority over the relevant
actions, the agency cannot be considered a legally relevant 'cause' of the
effect."55 In reaching its decision, the Court first noted that FMCSA does
not have the authority to exclude Mexican trucks from the U.S. 56 The
Court also applied Metropolitan Edison Co. and considered the causal
relationship between the FMCSA's actions and the environmental
impact. It found that the "'but for' causal relationship is insufficient to
make an agency responsible for a particular effect under NEPA and the
relevant regulations." 58
D. Ninth Circuit Decisions
The Ninth Circuit dealt with a case involving the NEPA and the
s0 Id at 759.
" Id. at 760.
52 Id. at 761.
5 Id.
54 Id. at 762.
" Id. at 770.
1 Id. at 766.
" Id. at 767.
58 Id.
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licensing of a nuclear facility in Mothers for Peace.59 In Mothers for
Peace, the NRC approved a license to construct and operate a facility in
Diablo Canyon that stored spent fuel from two nuclear reactors on the
60
site. In granting the license, the NRC rejected the petition of the San
Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace arguing that the NEPA required a
terrorism review. 6 1 The Ninth Circuit held that "in considering the policy
goals of NEPA . .. the possibility of terrorist attack is not so 'remote and
highly speculative' as to be beyond NEPA's requirements." 62
The court in Mothers for Peace attempted to distinguish
Metropolitan Edison Co. by describing it as involving a chain of three
events: "(1) a major federal action; (2) a change in the physical
environment; and (3) an effect." 63  The Ninth Circuit said that
Metropolitan Edison Co. "was concerned with the relationship between
events 2 and 3."64 In contrast, the court said that the instant case involved
"the disputed relationship . . . between events 1 and 2," with step one
being "the federal act, or the licensing of the Storage Installation" and
event two being the "change in the physical environment, or the terrorist
attack."65 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit found that the "reasonably close
causal relationship" test from Metropolitan Edison Co. did not apply, and
instead created a test requiring agencies to consider, under the NEPA, all
events that are not "remote and highly speculative." 66
Another case decided by the Ninth Circuit involving the
requirements of the NEPA was Ground Zero Center for Non-Violent
Action v. Department of the Navy,67 in which several environmental
groups challenged the United States Navy's missile upgrade program at a
submarine base in Bangor, Washington. 68  The petitioners in the case
5 San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 449 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2006).
6 Id. at 1019-21.
61 See id. at 1021-22.62 Id. at 1031 (internal quotation marks omitted).6 1Id. at 1029.
6 Id.
6s Id. at 1030.66 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
67 383 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2004).68 Id at 1083-84.
423
TERRORIST ATTACKS & NEPA
asserted "that NEPA requires the Navy to issue a new or supplemental EIS
assessing the environmental risk of an accidental explosion of a . . .
missile during operations at Bangor . . . [and] to assess the environmental
impact that would occur." 69 The court stated that established law shows
not every conceivable environmental impact requires an EIS.70 Instead,
the court said, an EIS only requires a reasonable discussion of the
probable environmental consequences, not remote and speculative
consequences. 7 ' The court went on to hold that since "the Navy has made
detailed study of the risk of an accidental explosion, and has determined
this risk to be extremely remote," it had already satisfied all that is
required under the NEPA.72
E. Mid States Coalition for Progress v. Surface Transportation Board
Among the cases decided by the Eighth Circuit of the U.S. Court
of Appeals, the one that is most relevant to this note is Mid States
Coalition for Progress v. Surface Transportation Board.73 In Surface
Transportation Board, several organizations challenged the Surface
Transportation Board's (hereinafter "Board") decision to approve the
Dakota, Minnesota & Eastern Railroad Corporation's construction of 280
miles of rail line and an additional upgrade to 600 miles of existing rail
line in Minnesota and South Dakota.74 One of the petitioner's assertions
was that the Board should have considered issues raised by a train
derailment in Maryland that released toxic materials, and the terrorist
attacks on September 11, 2001, in a supplemental EIS.7 s The Board
contended that the project would actually increase safety "because it
69 Id. at 1086.
7 0 d. at 1089 (quoting No GWEN Alliance of Lane County, Inc. v. Aldridge, 855 F.2d
1380, 1385 (9th Cir. 1988)).
71 Id at 1089-90 (quoting Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1283 (9th Cir.
1974)).
72 Id. at 1091.
7 345 F.3d 520 (8th Cir. 2003).
74 Id. at 532.
7 id. at 543.
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entailed system-wide improvements to existing track."76 The Board also
noted that the two incidents (the train derailment and the September 11
attacks) did not pose a specific threat to the areas in which the project was
located.77
The court began its analysis by stating that an agency's EIS does
not need to be supplemented every time additional information is brought
to light.78  "To require otherwise would render agency decision-making
intractable, always awaiting updated information only to find the new
information outdated by the time a decision is made."79 As such, denials
of requests to supplement an EIS are reviewed with the rule of reason.80
The court went on to say that deference should be given to the agency as
long as the decision was not arbitrary or capricious. Following these
statements, the court held that "the Board exercised its permissible
discretion when it determined that any increased threat was general in
nature and did not bear specifically on . . . the proposed DM & E
project." 82
With this legal background, the Third Circuit addressed the issues
presented in the instant case.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The Third Circuit focused on two flaws in the NJDEP's argument
in reaching its holding, stating that each by itself was enough to support
the lower court's decision. 83
6 1d. at 543-44.
n7Id. at 544.78 Id. (quoting Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 363 (1989)).
79 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Marsh, 490 U.S. at 373).80 Id. (citing Marsh, 490 U.S. at 374).
81 Id. (citing Marsh, 490 U.S. at 377).
82 id.
83 N.J. Dep't of Envtl Prot. v. NRC, 561 F.3d 132, 136 (3d Cir. 2009). A third issue
regarding the standard of review was discussed by the court, but no decision was made.
Id at 137 n.4. Both the NRC and AmerGen argued that the court should use the
"arbitrary and capricious standard" that is required by the Administrative Procedure Act,
while NJDEP contended that since the NRC's decision was one of law, the court should
425
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The first failure in the NJDEP's argument, according to the court,
was that it did not show that there was a reasonably close causal
relationship between the environmental impact of a terrorist attack and the
Oyster Creek relicensing proceedings.84 The court began its discussion of
this issue by drawing rules of law out of two Supreme Court decisions
regarding the circumstances in which the NEPA requires a governmental
85
agency to prepare an EIS. First, the court noted that in determining
"when NEPA requires consideration of a particular environmental effect,
agencies and reviewing courts 'must look at the relationship between that
effect and the change in the physical environment caused by the major
federal action at issue."' 86 Following this, the court said that a reasonably
close causal relationship is required before the NEPA will require an
agency to prepare an EIS." Second, the court observed that when an
agency's action is considered a cause of an environmental effect, and the
agency has no authority to prevent the effect, it is considered a "but for"
cause; a "but for cause" is not enough to delegate responsibility for that
effect to the agency under the NEPA. With these rules in mind, the court
stated that the NRC had no authority over the airspace above its facilities,
indicating that an aircraft attack would be beyond the reasonably close
causal relationship required for the NEPA to attach.89
The court went on to analyze the issue under traditional tort law
concepts of causation, and then applied those concepts to a situation in
which the NRC would play the role of the negligent party.90 The court
concluded that the act of a third party, in this case a terrorist attacking
Oyster Creek in an airplane, would be a superseding cause; and as such,
under traditional tort law concepts of causation, the NRC would not be
apply the "reasonableness standard." Id. The court declined to rule on this issue since
the NRC's decision would stand under either standard of review. Id.
'Id. at 136.
" Id. at 137.
86 Id. (quoting Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 773
(1983)).
87 id
8 Id. at 139 (quoting Metro. Edison Co., 460 U.S. at 767).
9 Id. at 139-40.
90 1d. at 140.
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responsible for the effect of the attack.91 The court further supported its
argument by discussing Port Authority of New York & New Jersey in
which the Third Circuit said that "the World Trade Center bombing was
not a natural or probable consequence of any design defect in defendants'
products ... [and] the terrorists' actions were superseding and intervening
events breaking the chain of causation." 92
Next, the court noted that it was rejecting the decision of the Ninth
Circuit in Mothers for Peace. In Mothers for Peace, the Ninth Circuit
abandoned the reasonably close causal relationship test of the Supreme
Court. 93  In New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, the
Third Circuit stated that the Supreme Court's test was still the rule of law
in the Third Circuit, and it also noted that the Ninth Circuit was the only
one in which the test was abandoned. 94 The Third Circuit also said that
Mothers for Peace could be distinguished from the instant case because it
involved the proposed construction of a new facility.95  The court
acknowledged that this change to the physical environment could arguably
hold "a closer causal relationship to a potential terrorist attack than the
mere relicensing of an existing facility."9 6
Finally, the court rejected the assertion that the NRC's other efforts
to prevent terrorist attacks were relevant to the issue of whether there was
a close causal relationship between the environmental impact of a terrorist
attack and the Oyster Creek relicensing proceedings.97 The court relied
on, rather than rejecting, a Ninth Circuit decision that held "precautionary
actions to guard against a particular risk do not trigger a duty to perform a
NEPA analysis."9 Taking into account all of the preceding discussion,
9' Id. at 140-41.92 Id. at 141 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Port Auth. of N.Y & N.J. v.
Arcadian Corp.,189 F.3d 305, 319 (3d Cir. 1999)).







98 Id (citing Ground Zero Ctr. for Non-Violent Action v. Dep't of the Navy, 383 F.3d
1082, 1090-91 (9th Cir. 2004)).
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the court held that the NRC was correct in deciding that a reasonably close
causal relationship did not exist between Oyster Creek's relicensing and
the environmental effects that would be caused by a terrorist attack.99
The court went on to discuss the second flaw in the NJDEP's
argument, which was that the NRC had already made an assessment of the
environmental effects of a hypothetical terrorist attack on a nuclear
facility.'00 The court said that the NRC addressed the risk of a terrorist
attack in its GEIS, and concluded that even though the risk was impossible
to quantify it was still relatively small.' 0 The court also found that the
GEIS said that if such an event were to occur, the effects would be no
different than those expected from an internal malfunction.102
Additionally, the court pointed to the fact that the NRC's SEIS analyzed
alternatives to mitigate severe accidents at Oyster Creek.103 The court said
that these two statements, taken together, "provide both generic and site-
specific analyses of potential environmental impacts at Oyster Creek
arising from terrorist attacks."' 04 Furthermore, the court found that the
NJDEP failed to provide evidence to suggest that the NRC could have
engaged in a more meaningful analysis of the risks of an attack, which it
was required to do according to Limerick Ecology Action v. NRC.0 5 The
court stated that since the NJDEP had failed to meet that burden, it did not
present an admissible contention before the NRC.10 6
Ultimately, the court concluded that the NJDEP did not show that a
reasonably close causal relationship existed between the environmental
effects of a hypothetical terrorist aircraft attack and the Oyster Creek
relicensing proceeding.' 0 7 As such, a NEPA evaluation was not required






" Id. at 144.
105 Id. (citing Limerick Ecology Action v. NRC, 869 F.2d 719, 744 (3d Cir. 1989)).
106 Id.
107 Id. at 143.
i' Id. at 136.
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environmental effects of a terrorist attack in both its GEIS and SEIS.'09
Since the NJDEP did not provide any evidence to show that the NRC
could have undertaken a more meaningful analysis of these risks, it did not
present an admissible contention before the NRC." 0
V. COMMENT
The issue presented in New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection appears, at first glance, to be simple and straightforward:
should the NRC, before issuing a license to a nuclear plant, be required to
assess the environmental impact of an airborne terrorist attack? It seems
that most Americans would answer in the affirmative, particularly in the
wake of the September 11 attacks and the fear of a nuclear disaster.
However, as the foregoing discussion will show, the issue really is not so
clear-cut, especially when one observes the lack of abilities of the NRC to
prevent a potential terrorist attack. The proceeding comment will discuss
the current split in authority surrounding this issue, as well as the potential
effects of the NRC's increase in security regulations aimed at dealing with
an attack. It will conclude with a brief discussion on the implications for
Missouri and the lack of a Supreme Court decision regarding this
particular issue.
A. Split Decision
As mentioned, New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection presents a split in authority among the various circuits of the
U.S. Court of Appeals concerning the NEPA requirements."' In holding
that the NEPA does not require the NRC to prepare an EIS concerning the
effect of an airborne terrorist attack on a nuclear facility, the Third Circuit
followed the decisions of several other circuits similarly finding no
requirement in the NEPA to analyze the environmental effects of third
"o9 Id at 144.
11o Id.
" Robert I. McMurry et al., NEPA in 2009: The National Environmental Policy Act:
New Challenges and Applications, SR004 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 369, 372-73 (2009).
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party sabotage.112 The court's holding, along with precedent set in other
circuits, conflicts with the decision of the Ninth Circuit in Mothers for
Peace, which the Third Circuit specifically discussed and rejected.' '3 As a
result, there are now two different controlling decisions on the same issue.
The effect of this split is to create different requirements for the NRC to
follow when issuing a license to a nuclear power plant, with the only
reason for the distinction between the two sets of requirements being the
location of the nuclear plant. Such a distinction would appear to be trivial;
but when one looks at the likelihood of a terrorist attack, and the NRC's
ability to prevent it, the Third Circuit's decision seems to be the more
logical approach.
B. Prior NRC Actions and Its Current Responsibilities
There is no doubt that nuclear power plants would be considered
by terrorists to be prime targets for airborne attacks." 4 Indeed, "[m]ost
existing nuclear power plants were not specifically designed to withstand
crashes from large jetliners."" Since the September 11 attacks, Congress
and the NRC have taken extensive efforts to increase the security of
nuclear power plants. In December 2008, the NRC imposed a series of
new regulations requiring plants to develop new strategies for handling the
112 N.J. Dep't ofEnvtl Prot., 561 F.3d at 142-43; see also Mid States Coal. for Progress v.
Surface Transp. Bd., 345 F.3d 520, 544 (8th Cir. 2003) (stating that the Board's decision
was within its permissible discretion and not arbitrary or capricious in declining to
supplement an EIS in the wake of September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks); Limerick
Ecology Action v. NRC, 869 F.2d 719, 743 (3d Cir. 1989) (upholding an NRC decision
not to analyze risks of sabotage because the risk could not properly be assessed and
petitioner presented no meaningful method to do so); Glass Packaging Inst. v. Regan, 737
F.2d 1083, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (upholding an agency decision not to issue an EIS on
potential criminal tampering with bottles); City of New York v. Dep't of Transp., 715
F.2d 732, 750 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding the Department of Transportation's decision that
"risks of sabotage were too far afield for consideration" in a NEPA analysis justified).
113 N.J. Dep't ofEnvil Prot., 561 F.3d at 142.
114 In his January 2002 State of the Union speech, President Bush said that U.S. forces
"found diagrams of American nuclear power plants" in al-Qaeda materials in
Afghanistan. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 29, 2002).
115 HOLT & ANDREws, supra note 2, at 1.
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effects of an aircraft crash and to improve training for security
personnel.116 Additionally, in February of 2009, the NRC began requiring
any new nuclear facility to be capable of withstanding the collision of a
large airplane without releasing radioactivity." 7
With all of the NRC's increased security regulations, one could
make the assumption that the NRC is recognizing the possibility of a
terrorist attack, and as such should be responsible for conducting a NEPA
analysis of that risk. However, recognizing the possibility that an event
will occur and preparing for it does not trigger a responsibility to base
one's final decision on that possibility. Both the Third Circuit and Ninth
Circuit recognized this principle." 8
To illustrate this point, consider a typical law student, who most
likely rents his/her respective residence while still in school. Most law
students recognize the chance that their personal property could be
destroyed by arson or stolen while they are spending long hours in the
library. As such, it would be prudent for them to purchase renter's
insurance to protect the value of their personal property. Such an act can
be characterized as recognizing and preparing for an event. However,
simply purchasing renter's insurance does not trigger a responsibility on
the student's part to choose an apartment based on the possibility of arson
or burglary occurring at that location. Admittedly, this situation is very
different from the instant case, but the same basic principles hold true. In
recognizing and preparing for a terrorist attack, the NRC has not triggered
a duty to consider the possibility of such an event in its decision to
relicense a nuclear facility.
Along these lines, all of the NRC's increased security regulations
show that the NRC is only responsible for mitigating the chances that such
an attack will succeed once it is commenced. There is no indication that





8 N.J Dep 't ofEnvil Prot., 561 F.3d at 143 ("[P]recautionary actions to guard against a
particular risk do not trigger a duty to perform a NEPA analysis." (citing Ground Zero
Ctr. for Non-Violent Action v. Dep't of the Navy, 383 F.3d 1082, 1090-91 (9th Cir.
2004))).
431
TERRORIST ATTACKS & NEPA
terrorist attacks on the facilities it oversees. Those responsibilities fall
upon other governmental agencies, such as the FBI, the Department of
Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, and the Federal Aviation
Administration."' 9 To suggest that the NRC would be responsible for such
things would enlarge its regulatory power beyond both the agency's
financial resources and its intended scope of power.' 20 This was one of
the arguments the court was making in New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection when it discussed the Supreme Court's holding
in Public Citizen, which said that "where an agency has no ability to
prevent a certain effect due to its limited statutory authority over the
relevant actions, the agency cannot be considered a legally relevant
'cause' of the effect."'21
Returning to the hypothetical law student, even though a student
has purchased renter's insurance, he/she cannot be considered a "cause" of
an arson or burglary when there was nothing he/she could do to prevent it.
The same can be said for the NRC, which has no power or authority to
prevent an airborne terrorist attack. All it can do is prepare for the event
and attempt to mitigate the resulting damage as much as possible, much
like law students who purchase renter's insurance. Accordingly, the Third
Circuit was correct in holding that there was no reasonably close causal
relationship between the NRC's relicensing of Oyster Creek and a
potential terrorist attack, since the NRC could not be said to have triggered
a responsibility to perform a NEPA analysis when it prepared for such an
attack and it lacked the power to prevent it.
C. The Implications for Missouri
Since Missouri is located within the Eighth Circuit of the U.S.
Court of Appeals, that court's precedent controls the NRC's actions in
relicensing nuclear power plants located within the state.122 The only
"
9 Id. at 141.
120 id
121 Dep't of Transp. v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 770 (2004).
122 See U.S. Courts, Circuit Map, http://www.uscourts.gov/courtlinks/ (last visited Feb.
21,2009).
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nuclear power reactor currently functioning in Missouri is located in
Callaway County.' 23  The Callaway Plant was issued its license on
October 18, 1984, and the license is valid until October 18, 2024.124 As
such, it seems unlikely that there will still be a split in authority regarding
whether the NEPA requires the NRC to prepare an EIS on potential
airborne terrorist attacks once the Callaway Plant's license is up for
renewal. However, it is important to note that in 2007 the Su reme Court
declined to review the decision in Mothers for Peace. 12 One can
speculate that the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Mothers for
Peace combined with the Third Circuit's decision in New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection will soon force the Supreme
Court to settle the split between the circuits.
Yet, if the circuit split remains at the time the Callaway Plant's
license is up for renewal, the issue will be one of first impression for the
Eighth Circuit. Among the cases decided by the Eighth Circuit, the most
analogous to New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection is
Surface Transportation Board, in which the court upheld a Board's
decision declining to supplement a previously issued EIS in the wake of
the September 11 attacks because "any increased threat was general in
nature and did not bear specifically on" the proposed project. 126
While Surface Transportation Board can be distinguished from
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, there are a number
123 See U.S. NRC, Callaway Plant, Unit 1, http://www.nrc.gov/info-
finder/reactor/call.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2009). The location of Callaway County in
Missouri is highlighted in red below:
124
125 John H. Stan & Mike Ferullo, Radioactive Waste: U.S. Supreme Court Declines to
Review Case on Terror Assessment in NEPA Review, DAILY ENv'T REP. (BNA), Jan. 17,
2007, at A-1.
126 Mid States Coal. for Progress v. Surface Transp. Bd., 345 F.3d 520, 544 (8th Cir.
2003).
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of similarities that warrant attention. First, both cases involved an
agency's responsibility under the NEPA to consider the threat of a
potential terrorist attack in the form of an EIS. Second, the responsible
agency in both cases declined to include such an assessment because the
risk was general in nature and too remote from the proposed action.
Finally, in both cases the responsible agency had already analyzed the
potential risk of a terrorist attack before deciding not to include a more
detailed analysis in the form of an EIS. When one looks at the similarities
between the two cases, it is likely that if a case like New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection came before the Eighth Circuit,
then it would be decided in a similar manner.
Another factor that supports this assertion is that the Eighth Circuit
specifically said in Surface Transportation Board that it applies the "rule
of reason" when reviewing an agency's denial to supplement an EIS. 27 In
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, the Third Circuit
stated that it was rejecting the decision in Mothers for Peace, partly
because the Ninth Circuit had abandoned the Supreme Court's "rule of
reason" test. 128 This suggests that since the Eighth Circuit has already
decided a case similar to New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection using the "rule of reason" test, and the Third Circuit's decision
also applied the test (while rejecting another decision that abandoned the
test), the Eighth Circuit is likely to decide a case like New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection in the same way as the Third
Circuit. Still, the issue is currently undecided in Missouri, and will remain
so until either the Supreme Court or the Eighth Circuit rules on it.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Third Circuit's decision that NEPA does not require the NRC
to prepare an EIS concerning a hypothetical terrorist attack, contrary to an
earlier ruling by the Ninth Circuit, recognizes the NRC's lack of control
over preventing such an attack. Given the NRC's inability to thwart these
127 Id. (citing Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 374 (1989)).
12 N.J. Dep't of Envtl Prot. v. NRC, 561 F.3d 132, 142 (3d Cir. 2009) (construing San
Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 449 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2006)).
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threats, it would be irrational to require it to consider such a possibility
when relicensing a nuclear power plant. Still, the current split in authority
shows that there is a clear need for the Supreme Court to review this issue,
despite the Court's reluctance to grant certiorari in Mothers for Peace.
Without a clear resolution, the NRC is left with two different requirements
to follow when licensing a nuclear power plant, with the only distinction
being the federal circuit in which the particular facility is located.
THOMAS C. SMITH
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